Posts filed under 'Hillary Clinton'

Examining Obama’s own defenders on missile defence

In the interests of making sure I avoided the echo chamber that we can sometimes get stuck in on the blogosphere, I’ve spent some time today explicitly looking for people who defend Obama’s missile decision and considering their points.  And where better to start than the administration itself.  Robert Gates has written in defence of the decision today, and he offers three main points.  He says it will provide a defence capability earlier than the old plan, that it will be more adaptable than the old system, and that it will defend against the short-range missiles that are more likely to be a threat in the near future.

None of this is necessarily untrue, but it is not the whole story.  “We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe,” is how Gates ends his article.  However, there is no way the administration can deny that the new plan has the effect of pushing back defence against ICBMs from 2015 to 2020.  It’s true that it introduces defences against short and medium-range missiles, and on a shorter timeframe than the old plan would have delivered anything, but there was no reason why the administration couldn’t simply have combined the two systems.  They are not mutually exclusive.  The new plan doesn’t defend against ICBMs on a shorter timeframe; in fact, it doesn’t defend against them at all.

The new plan is certainly more flexible.  From a military and technical standpoint, placing defences on ships is favourable to having static land-based sites that are at the mercy of the host governments.  In theory, anyway – in practice, it might be difficult to operate ships in the Black or Baltic Seas.  And the plan is only flexible insofar as it addresses threats other than ICBMs.  Any defence against ICBMs would require a land-based site such as the one planned in Poland, and the vague hints than such a site might eventually be placed in Israel, the Balkans or Turkey certainly don’t indicate that there is a a well-thought-out plan for tackling the ICBM threat.  Getting a foreign government to agree to host such a site is not necessarily going to be easy – so, despite the flexibility of the new plan in tackling other threats, it must be stressed away that Obama has traded away a defence against ICBMs.

“Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue,” writes Gates, who tries to portray the decision as an entirely pragmatic move made on purely military grounds.  Clinton has repeated the assertion that the decision was “not about Russia”.  It may be true that Russia’s attitude played no part in Gates’ advice to the president, but no-one can be expected to believe that it played no part in Obama’s decision.  Indeed, if the administration wants us to believe that this decision was taken without any consideration of the Russians at all, then it wants us to believe that it is running an incompetent and ignorant foreign policy.  This decision is of a piece with the rest of the administration’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Russia.

Commentators outside the administration are more free to admit this, and can try to justify the grimey realpolitik that the administration has carried out but dare not speak the name of.  Hence, Meir Javendanfar writes that Obama is “prioritising” the desire to stop Iran becoming a nuclear state by trying to woo Russia.  He doesn’t address, however, the extremely tenuous nature of the evidence that this will work.  Indeed, even if the Russians were to agree not to wield their veto against tougher sanctions on Iran, the Chinese could still prevent them.  Furthermore, even if Chinese opposition could somehow be dropped and sanctions passed, it’s far from clear that Iran will capitulate and stop developing its nuke anyway.

There’s a more pertinent point to be made about prioritizing here.  You could argue that this decision means that the Obama administration is accomodating itself to the inevitability of an Iranian nuke.  In July, Clinton talked about pitching a “defence umbrella” over the Middle East to hedge against an Iranian nuke.  At the time I noted that she had omitted to say “nuclear umbrella” (which would imply the threat of nuclear retaliation), and now that this new plan involves talk of deployments to Turkey and Israel, we may be seeing the advent of this “defence umbrella”.  I cannot criticize them for taking this move, because I am extremely pessimistic about our ability to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  However, it’s worth remembering – again – that they have abandoned their hedge against an ICBM until at least 2020, which makes for an inconsistent policy if they are trying to hedge against the inevitability of an Iranian nuke.

Writing in The New Republic, Peter Scoblic hopes this will ease U.S.-Russian relations and adds that it shouldn’t worry the Eastern Europeans, because the system didn’t afford them any meaningful defence anyway.  On the last point, he is ignoring both the symbolic importance of the move in demonstrating the U.S. commitment to the region, and also the practical benefit of having American forces stationed there.  Both would militate against Russian interference.

And while it might improve the atmospherics in U.S.-Russian relations, any self-satisfaction on that score might well be restrained by the realization that good relations are about policy rather than warm feelings.  If the U.S. gave the Russians everything they want – entry into the WTO, high-technology transfers, recognition of their control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and a free hand to interfere in its near abroad – then I’m sure the Russians would consider their relations with the U.S. to be excellent.  This idea that we capitulate to other countries in exchange for a blissful state of nirvana described as “good relations” plays a large role in Obama’s foreign policy, and it is misguided.

A few other criticisms can be batted off more easily.  Stephen Walt apparently isn’t aware the ICBM-detection system was designed to prevent the East Coast of the United States as much as it was Europe, so the limited chance of the Iranians nuking Eastern Europe is not relevant; nor was this why the Czech and Polish governments wanted the facilities, as described above.  Fred Kaplan follows the administration’s explanation almost point-for-point, adding little, and notes that the ball is now in Russia’s court for proving if this decision was worthwhile – hardly a reassuring prospect.

That’s it.  I’m sure there’s more; feel free to link me to any particularly interesting articles that contain points I’ve missed.  But nothing I’ve read convinces me that this was anything short of  a poor decision, executed terribly.  The technical and intelligence rationale behind it is incomplete, because it doesn’t take into account the possibility of Iran developing an ICBM capability earlier than is apparently now envisaged – or, indeed, by 2015, as every extant intelligence estimate indicates.  And on a political level, it has the appearance almost as a calculated snub to U.S. allies and a nod and a wink to Russia.  If I could believe that it would achieve the goals for which it was apparently designed – enlisting Russian help on Iran and elsewhere – I would have pause for thought before condemning it.  But the fact it is unlikely to even achieve the ends for which it is intended is the most damning indictment of all, as it is for any policy.

Add comment September 20, 2009

Crunch time for Obama’s presidency

September is going to be the most crucial month of Obama’s presidency so far, and it could well determine the course of the rest of it.  Anyone who wants him to succeed needs to keep an eye on what he does this month in three crucial areas – healthcare, Afghanistan, and Iran – and one auxillary one, the Israeli-Arab conflict.

For a candidate who campaigned on an aggressive platform of “change” and activism, Obama has shown remarkably little of either since he got into the White House.  He has farmed out key decisions to other groups – Congressional Democrats in the case of healthcare and the stimulus bill, and Attorney General Holder in the case of investigations into Bush-era intelligence activity – and simply carried on business-as-usual in other areas.

His Iraq policy has been to continue with the agreements signed by the Bush administration, and he’s talked about this issue as little as possible.  He’s not much closer to closing Guantánamo Bay – and that deadline of a year is fast approaching – and nor has he fundamentally altered U.S. foreign relations, beyond making some speeches designed to act as outreach to foreign populations.

North Korea staged procative nuclear tests and his response was to invite Pyongyang back to the six party talks begun by the Bush administration.  Iran continued to develop a nuclear weapon and launched a stunning domestic crackdown and his response was to write letters to the Supreme Leader while continuing the Bush administration’s policy of wait-and-see.  Afghanistan slipped further into a morass and his response, wisely, was to dispatch more troops to pursue the goals laid out by his predecessor – but that far from settles the issue.  Pakistan continues to slip into chaos and Obama has continued Bush’s policy of support for the government.

Change in foreign policy is slightly more marked towards Israel, Russia, China, and Latin America – but not much.  Obama has criticized Israel in far stronger terms than Bush, and laid out a genuinely new policy on settlements: the outcome of this remains to be seen.  It might lead to new talks, but if it does the outcome is almost certainly likely to be negative and lead to a new round of bitter recriminations.

He has adopted a strictly realist approach to Russia and China, trying to minimize differences with the former and explicitly stating that human rights would not be made an issue in discussions with the latter.  He has stepped back from the Bush administration’s obsession with trying to influence these countries to adopt western values, but this has amounted more to a difference in tone than substance because Bush’s ability to influence these countries in that area was always limited.  When Russia invaded Georgia and China cracked down in Tibet, the Bush administration barely squeaked; Russian troops continue to occupy Georgia and China continues to brutally crack down on its ethnic Muslims and Obama has hardly made a peep, either.

In Latin America, Obama has continued with Bush-era policy of increasing co-operation with Colombia and Mexico to battle drug traffickers and guerillas.  He said he was going to normalize relations with Cuba but hasn’t done anything about it.  When the American military base deal in Ecuador expired, he turned to Bush’s (and, indeed, America’s) traditional ally in the region – Colombia – to sign a new ten-year lease on base access that has irked the Latin American left.  Hugo Chávez has blasted the agreement, but other Latin American leaders rallied around it.  On Honduras, Obama’s policy has been in step with the rest of the region, who all refuse to recognize the new de facto government and call for Manuel Zelaya to return to office.

None of the above is necessarily meant to be an indictment.  We’re only seven months into the new presidency and Obama has faced a crushing domestic agenda, although one that he has himself complicated by pushing for early action on healthcare.

The United States’ ability to act abroad is also limited by financial and domestic problems.  In the absence of clear crises that have demanded resolute decisions, Obama has remained much like Bush after the invasion of Iraq – the prevaricator-in-chief.  He hasn’t had bold ideas or actions to offer us that might fundamentally alter the approaches he inherited from Bush.

But the time of crisis is now upon us – and it starts at home.

Healthcare.  Obama has taken on one of the most politically-sensitive issues in America.  It nearly destroyed Clinton, and it largely contributed towards the drumming that the Democrats took in Congress in 1994.  The Obama administration is sure to be aware of the relevant history – Rahm Emanuel was an aide to Clinton, and Hillary was at the forefront of Clinton’s healthcare drive - but the devil in the details is what lesson they will derive from it.  We’ll find out when Obama gives his healthcare address to Congress tonight – he’s going to be staking a lot of his credibility on getting the outcome he wants, so it’s important that he keeps expectations realistic.

It’s also important that he make an attempt to speak to the vast majority of Americans who now oppose healthcare reform and think there are more urgent priorities.  These people may be wrong, but it won’t matter one way or another who was right if the Democrats ram through an unpopular bill and then get decimated in the 2010 elections.  The healthcare reform process is going to take a long time – probably decades – to fully enact after a bill is passed, and it’s essential that it has widespread public support.  An issue that affects one fifth of the U.S. economy and every one of its citizens cannot be addressed without some form of consensus.  Just as the uninsured need help, the majority of Americans who are sceptical about reform deserve slightly more than to be angrily dismissed and written off as the tool of special interest groups.

What happens on healthcare is also important for Obama’s foreign policy agenda.  The left-wing of his party have been denied some of the red meat they expected: quicker drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a legal pursuit of Bush administration officials, a gutting of the CIA, a more marked change in rendition (which, in case you hadn’t heard, Obama is continuing), and an even harder stand on Israel.  Winning on healthcare reform will allow Obama to have more slack elsewhere; losing on it will mean that he has to govern with increasing reference to the extreme wing of his party.

Afghanistan.  Soon, General Stanley McCrystal will request more troops for Afghanistan.  There is apparently a split within the Obama administration on whether he should get them.  Obama is reported to be leaning towards providing them, which is all to the good, even if the appearance of indecision can only help to weaken the resolve of NATO allies and strengthen that of the Taliban.  This is by far the most consequential decision that Obama will make this year for the future of the United States and the world.

The growing chorus of voices calling for disengagement from Afghanistan are, to me, baffling.  The consequences of failure are all too clear: the re-assertion of Taliban control over the country, with all the attendant human horror (have we forgotten already how they ruled before?); the destabilization of nuclear-armed Pakistan and the strengthening of militants there; the increased chance of terrorist attack all over the world, from Australia to India to London; a possibly-mortal blow to the credibility of NATO as an effective military alliance; and the grimly predictable, indeed inevitable, need for the world to intervene yet again, perhaps years later but certainly under much less advantageous conditions.

Afghanistan was the “good war” for so long, and went so unquestioned, that there now seems to be a whiff of panic as people finally wake up to the reality of the situation.  Upon discovering that what they thought was an adequate situation is in fact a deteriorating one, they have over-reacted and decided it is beyond salvation.  But just because the Bush administration made mistakes that we are only now waking up to, it does not mean that all is lost.  McCrystal is one of the most experienced and successful generals in the U.S. military, and he is certainly not under any pressure from this administration to declare that the war is winnable if it is not: his judgement should be respected.  And, that judgement given, Obama should follow it, otherwise he sows the seeds of a mortal danger.

Iran.  September was the deadline that the Obama administration placed on talks with Iran.  If they had not borne fruit by this point – and if the IAEA’s report out this month was negative – then Iran will face further sanctions and isolation.  Well, the IAEA says that Iran continues to enrich uranium and be unco-operative, and the newly-powerful conservative government in Iran has said that it has no interest in further talks.  This was one of the problems with Obama’s campaign plank of talking to America’s enemies – sometimes they’re not interested.  Obama will have to seek more sanctions with the support of Russia and China, who are unlikely to be helpful.

Sanctions are anyway unlikely to persuade the Iranians to change their behaviour.  They can endure them until they have carried out successful nuclear tests, and then the rest of the world will gradually have to change its approach to them anyway – especially this administration, which has proven realistic to the core.  A military strike by the U.S. on Iran is unthinkable given the likely opposition to it at home, especially among Obama’s core voters – who, as discussed, he is having trouble keeping enchanted as it is.  But, on the other side, a strike by Israel – which could further inflame the Middle East and certainly make the Israeli-Palestinian issue unsolvable in the timeframe of this administration – is made more likely by the tense relations between Israel and Washington.  It’s also unlikely to set the Iranians back by more than a few years, and will no doubt harden their resolve to eventually be successful.

These are the three big decisions that make up September for Obama: how to proceed on healthcare, in Afghanistan, and towards Iran.  It’stime to see if this remarkable and charismatic politician turns out to also be the statesman he promised us, with original solutions that will change the rules of the game rather than just continuing in the well-worn lines of his predecessor.  I’m hoping that he does.

1 comment September 8, 2009

Clinton: U.S. might pitch nuclear umbrella over Middle East

Speaking in Thailand, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon then the U.S. will consider extending a “defense umbrella” across the Gulf. She previously voiced this idea during her presidential campaign, when she also said the umbrella should extend to Israel – she didn’t mention Israel this time, but clearly the policy would have to include Israel to be of any merit.

She also threatened “crippling action” against Iran if it tested a weapon, and argued that the nuclear pursuit would not enhance Iran’s security.

“I am simply pointing out that Iran needs to understand that its pursuit of nuclear weapons will not advance its security,” she said. “It faces the prospect if it pursues nuclear weapons of sparking an arms race in the region.”

“We also have made it clear that we will take action as I’ve said time and time again, crippling action,” Clinton said during the televised forum, without elaborating. She reiterated that the U.S. favors dialogue with Iran through multi-national talks, while adding that “we’re not going to keep the window open indefinitely.”

Dennis Ross, a senior Middle East advisor to Obama, is on record supporting the idea of pitching a nuclear umbrella over the Middle East – although his comments came before he joined the administraton. It’s notable that Clinton used the term “defence” and not “nuclear”, and she spoke about building up the “military capacity” of the Gulf nations. She hasn’t been explicit about the exact nature of the “defense umbrella”, but I think it’s fair to assume that the policy would eventually extend to nuclear deterrence – it’s hard to imagine it being credible otherwise.

So why doesn’t she make that explicit now? It seems quite likely that Clinton is making these comments at least in part to play to an Iranian audience, making an argument about the impact of the nuclear programme on that country’s security at a time when Iranian politics is more contentious and malleable than usual. Threatening to nuke Iran would play into the hands of the extremists in Iran and allow them to wax lyrical about the American threat – just talking about building up the defence capacity of the Gulf nations is much less contentious. The Iranians, I expect, are supposed to read between the lines.

When Iran has a nuclear weapon – and it’s notable than Clinton herself used the word “when” during these remarks – it’s freedom of action within the Middle East is going to be much less circumscribed than it is now. Clearly, if the mullahs nuke someone, they should and hopefully will receive a response in kind. But the power that nuclear weapons give to states is much more insidious than that. States with nuclear weapons can demand spheres of influence where they are free to act without the interference of outsiders – look at Russia in Georgia. There are many things they can do and get away with because the punishment of being nuked is not proportionate to the crime. Take just one possible scenario:

After all, if Iran chooses to, say, instigate a Shiite uprising or a coup in Bahrein and thus manages to topple the monarchy there, will America’s public support U.S. direct intervention? Before Secretary Clinton can get to a TV studio to make the case for sovereignty, stability, legitimacy, and all the rest of it, before CENTCOM can deploy, an army of pundits will be on CNN and al-Jazeera reminding us that the Sunni monarchy there is not exactly the expression of the will of the people; that the newly installed regime should be recognized as the authentic expression of the Bahreini nation; and that a small island-state and its not-so-democratic monarch do not deserve the shedding of American blood or the risks of a nuclear showdown with Iran. Before you know it, someone will be asking for America’s Fifth Fleet at Juffair base in Bahrein to pack up their bags and relocate.

Would we nuke Iran over this issue? No. But would we able to deploy any other policy options to reverse the course of events? No, we wouldn’t, due to the Iranian nuke. When Iran has a nuke, nuclear deterrence won’t be enough. Nuclear deterrence is an admission that you’ve failed to contain an enemy, because when you implement it you’ve already lost most of the battle, which is the battle to stop it doing numerous other things which fall short of launching a nuke but are still incredibly detrimental.

5 comments July 22, 2009

The emerging countours of Obama’s foreign policy

What do we know so far about how Barack Obama plans to run foreign policy?  A few points.

1) An Obama foreign policy is largely about talk.  So far, his main effort has been a PR offensive to try and repair the damage to America’s image that was done by President Bush.  He has gone to enormous lengths while in Europe to tell anyone who will listen that he represents “change” and that they can stop hating America now that the nasty cowboy has gone.  So far, this has resulted in few concrete achievements in return.  The strategy of basing a foreign policy on talk is modelled on Clinton – after all, talk is cheap, and neither of these Democrats want to be expending much else when they have their domestic programmes to focus on.  The difference is that under Clinton, the Europeans wanted things from America – Kyoto, ICC, leadership in the Balkans – whereas under Obama, America wants things from the Europeans, especially vis-a-vis Russia and South Asia.  Is his playing nice going to mean more help from the other side of the Atlantic?  Don’t hold your breath.

2) And Obama is taking the same approach to non-proliferation with regards to Iran and North Korea, even though this is apparently a major foreign policy goal which he dedicated a whole speech to in Prague.  This highlights how a lot of his talk is often going off at tangents from the real issue.  Yes, America  might not be at war with Islam – but Islamists are sure at war with america.  Yes, non-proliferation might be a worthy goal – but how on earth is he going to achieve it?  As Bret Stephens wrote after Obama responded to North Korea’s missile test by calling for another UN Security Council Resolution:

But the greatest prize for Mr. Kim [from the North Korea missile test] was the reaction from President Obama. “Rules must be binding,” the president told his audience in Prague on Sunday. “Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.” But how are words supposed to mean anything if all the administration proposes to do is offer up yet another resolution — which is to say, more words?

And what’s his strategy for Iran?  Talk, talk talk.  Which is basically just temporizing as events march on, as it is clear to anyone that talk isn’t going to stop the mullahs from developing their bomb.  No-one can seriously believe that the United Nations Security Council is an institution that is going to maintain international peace and security – so why is Obama still making it a centrepiece of his foreign policy?  Are he or his advisors really so steeped in the anti-Bush rhetoric of the last few years, to the extent they’ll accept anything he rejected?  Do they really buy it?

3) This leads us to a deeper level of analysis – Obama’s foreign policy is realist.  Faced with declining means and a desire not to go looking for trouble, Obama is radically reorienting the proposed ends of American foreign policy – he wants to “reset” relations with Russia despite its authoritarian backsliding, Hillary Clinton publicly said she isn’t going to pressure China on human rights, Obama has said his interest in Afghan democracy is only secondary, and Obama doesn’t intend to do anything about the Iranian nuke or its repressive political system.  In fact, he has repeatedly and sickeningly reached out to the tyrants of Tehran despite the fact they continue to humiliate him and the United States through public rejections.

4) He insists on blaming things on his predecessor, which is all very well but hardly a substitute for future policy.  When discussing Iraq and Afghanistan, he managed to get jabs at Bush’s past policies into every speech, without once acknowledging American successes there.  In Europe, he keeps telling everyone how different he is and how America is changing thanks to him, although once it becomes apparent that this change consists of withdrawing from the world and letting aggressive countries do what they want, everyone might rethink their jubilation.  We need some clue that he doesn’t buy into his own rhetoric or see foreign policy mainly as an extension of politics – his political advisor, David Axelrod, is the first political advisor to ever attend National Security Council meetings.

5) By acting in this way, he is letting others dictate the movement of the international environment.  Iran is busy reshaping the Middle East, Russia has increased latitude in Eastern and Central Europe, and North Korea is busy stamping its feet in East Asia.  Many of these trends date back to Bush’s focus on Iraq – “no country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time” – but Obama’s tenure should have been an opportunity to reverse some – even one – of these trends.  We’ve heard nothing but excorciating criticism about Bush’s foreign policy for eight years.  Where are the alternatives?  Is the alternative in fact just to let things continue while talking nicely?

6) By acting in this way, he seems to be accepting the judgement – popular in Europe – that it is the United States that is the main source of tension and trouble in the world, not aggressive countries like Iran and North Korea.  By simply backing off and spreading good vibes with his rhetoric, he is trying to show the rest of the world that the sort of activism which characterized the Bush presidency is gone, and a new era of chilled-out co-operation is here.  This strategy is comforting exactly to the people who don’t matter because they’re not a threat anyway, but gives a green light to everyone who wants to take actions opposed to America’s interests.  Not everyone in the world is dedicated to international co-operation as much as Barack Obama.

7) The one major strategic initiative he has committed to, in Afghanistan, is ill-defined and half-hearted.  That might not necessarily be a problem – at least it’s a start – but points one to five tend to suggest it might be abandoned or scaled back further when things get tough.  Obama didn’t spell out its necessity or generational significance – to do so might have sounded too much like Bush, I suppose – and Americans are not that interested or convinced about the war.  Obama’s incrementalism will hardly have helped turn them around.  He might pay a significant political price for it – will he stick it out, like Bush bravely did?

Add comment April 7, 2009

Clinton’s honesty

During Hillary Clinton’s trip to Asia, we had a glimpse at what diplomacy will look like during the Obama administration – and apparently respect for diplomatic taboos or sensibilities will not be high on the agenda. First, in Seoul, Clinton openly speculated that the recent threats coming out of what she called the “hermit kingdom” (that is, North Korea) might be a result of a succession crisis within the country. This has long been considered a diplomatic no-no. As for calling it the “hermit kingdom” – remind me again of the difference between “cowboy diplomacy” and “smart power”?

But, by far the biggest dose of “honesty” came with respect to China’s human rights record. Here is what she said:

Now, that doesn’t mean that questions of Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, the whole range of challenges that we often engage on with the Chinese, are not part of the agenda. But we pretty much know what they are going to say.

We have to continue to press them but our pressing on those issues can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crises. We have to have a dialog that leads to an understanding and cooperation on each of those.

Which prompted Amnesty International to point out:

T. Kumar of Amnesty International USA said the global rights lobby was “shocked and extremely disappointed” by Clinton’s remarks.

“The United States is one of the only countries that can meaningfully stand up to China on human rights issues,” he said.

“But by commenting that human rights will not interfere with other priorities, Secretary Clinton damages future US initiatives to protect those rights in China,” he said.

Quite. And while it is obvious to anyone that with the credit crunch unfolding, human rights are pretty low down the agenda in any U.S.-China dialogue, making a blanket public statement that the U.S. considers them subordinate to other issues is just inviting Chinese officials to ignore U.S. pressure on them for now and ever more. No-one realistically expects Beijing to roll over on the issue, but the cumulative effect of decades of public pressure adds up to something. It’s an aspect of subtle diplomacy – one might say “smart power”, the moral power of the United States. But once you have said what she has said, private comments about them cannot help but take on the character of a formulaic pronouncement that everyone knows you don’t mean. A nod and a wink between the powerful to not care about the weak. And it means losing crucial leverage over Beijing. It also means losing crucial leverage over other countries, who will conclude that if they are strong enough – or nuclear enough – they can do whatever they want to their own people.

In 1976, President Gerald Ford attended the Helsinki Conference on European security issues, the conference that resulted in the Helsinki Accords, which played a huge role in creating the monitoring mechanisms that highlighted human rights abuses in the Soviet bloc and helped to end the Cold War. He addressed the Soviets on the issue of individual freedoms and human rights. “To my country,” he said, “these are not just cliches or empty phrases”. This represented the best traditions of American diplomacy.  Addressing the Chinese, Hillary Clinton just said the exact opposite.

What is even more unforgivable is that Clinton chose to do this at a time when renewed repression is sweeping Tibet, and as the anniversaries of both the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre and the 1959 Tibetan uprising approach. Shame on her, and shame on a media that fails to condemn it.

1 comment February 21, 2009

Russia to not sell Iran important defensive weapon – yet

Despite bluster about not caring what the Obama administration thinks about its relations with Iran, Russia appears to have decided not to sell Iran the S-300 (NATO designation SA-20) air defence system.  The system, which is one of the most advanced in the world, would have such an impact on the strategic balance in the region that it has even been suggested that if a sale were to go ahead, Israel would be obliged to try and knock out Iran’s nuclear facilities before it could be delivered.

Iran and Russia have reportedly signed a deal on the delivery of five of the systems, but has not yet actually gone ahead with the sale.  Now, it seems Russia is using the sale as a bargaining chip with the Obama administration.

The proposed sale of the arms to Iran was discussed on Sunday and Monday in Jerusalem during what Israeli officials described as “very good” talks with visiting RussianForeign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov met with President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu.

Israel “heard from him very clearly that Russia would not sell weapons to any countries in the area that would tip the strategic balance in the region,” one source said. The S-300 is considered to be just such a weapon.

The source said that Lavrov, in a reference to Israeli arms sales to Georgia, said Moscow expected Israel “to show the same responsibility.”

The question of Israeli arms sales to Georgia arose last year during the Russian-Georgia crisis over South Ossetia. Israel maintained that it was only selling defensive, not offensive arms, to Georgia.

…

Pravda carried a story on its Web site Tuesday saying that Russia – at least for now – was not approving the sale since that might hurt Moscow’s dialogue with the new Obama administration. Lavrov is scheduled to meet US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton next month, and RussianPresident Dmitry Medvedev is to meet US President Barack Obama in April to discuss nuclear disarmament issues and the deployment of US missiles in Eastern Europe.

Russia will of course want something in return from the U.S. for its restraint, and this is likely to be a cancellation of the Eastern European missile shield.

Add comment February 18, 2009

U.S condemns Iranian persecution of minorities

This just came into my inbox from the State Department:

The United States condemns the Iranian government’s decision to level baseless charges of espionage against seven leaders of the Iranian Baha’i community: Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, Mr. Vahid Tizfahm and Mrs. Mahvash Sabet. Authorities have detained these Baha’i for more than nine months without access to legal counsel or making public any evidence against them. The accusations reported in Iranian and international media are part of the ongoing persecution of Baha’i in Iran. Thirty other Baha’i remain imprisoned in Iran solely on the basis of their religious belief.

Other religious minorities continue to be targeted solely on the basis of their beliefs. Last month authorities arrested three Christians: Jamal Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali and Hamik Khachikian. In addition, authorities detained several members of the Gonabadi Dervishes, followers of Sufism, on Kish Island in January.

We join the international community in urging the authorities to release all religious minorities who are currently in detention for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Add comment February 13, 2009

U.S. “deeply concerned” over Iran satellite launch

Here’s what the State Department is saying about Iran’s alleged launch of a satellite, which puts it closer to a long-range missile delivery system:

Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop its missile delivery capabilities remain a matter of deep concern. Recently, Iran’s development of a space launch vehicle (SLV) capable of putting a satellite into orbit establishes the technical basis from which Iran could develop long-range ballistic missile systems. Many of the technological building blocks involved in SLVs are the same as those required to develop long-range ballistic missiles.

Working with the United Nations, we have passed a number of UN Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1737, which require states to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply of, inter alia, specified equipment and technology that could contribute to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. We will continue with our friends and allies in the region to address the threats posed by Iran, including those related to its missile and nuclear programs and its support of terrorism.

Add comment February 3, 2009

Obama’s first day

We didn’t get much meat from Obama on day one.  He ordered a 120 day suspension of the Guantanamo trials, but an executive order on shutting the prison facility within a year is due to come today.  He also addressed some housekeeping, ethics and records rules.  An executive order on records itself only seems to loosen the rules on the assertion of executive privilege over their records by former presidents, investing substantial power in the current president to make decisions about disclosure.  It defines a breach of executive privilege as when the release of documents “might impair national security (including the conduct of foreign relations), law enforcement, or the deliberative processes of the executive branch”.  This undoes an executive order Bush issued in November 2001 that made it a lot easier for former presidents to hang onto their documents.

It’s very easy, of course, to sign away the privacy of your predecessors; let’s see how the current administration reacts when it wants to keep its own dirty laundry secret.  But for the moment, Obama has issued a memo telling the executive to take a “presumption in favour of disclosure” when dealing with FOIA requests, although we’ll have to see how that works out exactly in practice – these issues have a tendency to drop off the radar screen in the face of other, more pressing, priorities.

Then there were his lobbying rules.  These rules bar anyone from working for agencies which they had lobbied within the previous two years, or leaving the executive branch and then lobbying it – the latter clause applying “for as long as I am president”.  Er, except when the rules don’t apply, that is:

The Republican National Committee criticized that requirement and said the new administration was already violating it. Mr. Obama’s nominee for deputy secretary of defense, William Lynn, has been a lobbyist for the defense contractor Raytheon, and his nominee for deputy secretary of health and human services, William V. Corr, lobbied for stricter tobacco regulations as an official with the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.

A senior White House official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, conceded the two nominees did not adhere to the new rules. But he said that Mr. Lynn had the support of Republicans and Democrats, and would receive a waiver under the policy, and that Mr. Corr did not need a waiver because he had agreed to recuse himself from tobacco issues.

“When you set very tough rules, you need to have a mechanism for the occasional exception,” this official said, adding, “We wanted to be really tough, but at the same time we didn’t want to hamstring the new administration or turn the town upside down.”

Obama also retook the oath of office after he flubbed it on Inauguration Day – this is just a precaution to avoid any legal challenges to the legitimacy of his presidency after he said the oath out of the constitutionally-correct order.

That seems to be it for day one.  There’s a lot we still don’t know, such as his economic plans or exactly how quickly he’s going to drawdown in Iraq, or what he’s going to do about Hamas.  We don’t know how the first top-secret intelligence briefings are going to change his mind on campaign issues, like they did with the non-existent missile gap that Kennedy campaigned on in 1960.  More to come later after Obama makes policy announcements today.

Add comment January 22, 2009

The Clinton hearing

Hillary Clinton is up before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today for a confirmation hearing.  Of course, it went smoothly, as it should: there is no reasonable bar to her nomination.  Here are a few thoughts on the process thus far.

The first is about the Clinton Global Initiative, the Clinton Presidential Library, and the funding of these institutions.  Bill has raised some $492 million for the Initiative over ten years, and negotiated quite lenient disclosure rules with Obama.  The Initiative is actually actively involved in global issues.  As the WSJ notes

The silence over this is itself remarkable. When Henry Kissinger was invited merely to co-chair the 9/11 Commission, the political left went bonkers about his foreign clients. In this case we have a Secretary of State nominee whose husband may have raised more than $60 million from various Middle East grandees, and Washington reacts with a yawn.

The silence is all the more remarkable given the fact we have just been treated to years of hysteria about how ill-defined “links” between the Bush administration and the oil industry are supposed to have had a decisive influence on U.S. policy.  This conspiracy-mongering, follow-the-money attitude might be welcomed as zealous vigilance if it did not apparently hew entirely to partisan lines.  It was left to Dick Lugar to ask about the library money, and here’s what he said:

[T]he Clinton Foundation exists as a temptation for any foreign entity or government that believes it could curry favor through a donation. It also sets up potential problems with any action taken by the secretary of state in relation to foreign givers or their countries. The nature of the Secretary of State post makes recusal from specific policy decisions almost impossible, since even localized U.S. foreign policy activities can ripple across countries and continents. … The bottom line is that even well intentioned foreign donations carry risks for U.S. foreign policy.

If this comes back to bite the President later in his term and somehow obstructs him from the execution of his foreign policy, the Clintons will have a lot to answer for.

The meat of the hearing was predictably vague and not particularly encouraging.  Clinton vowed to use “smart power” abroad, which shows that one thing that hasn’t changed in Washington is the Clinton tendency to apply fluffy names to fluffier concepts.  Who could forget “assertive multilateralism” or the brief period when “rogue states” became mere “states of concern“?  In fact, these names are often the result of a state of denial about the lack of innovation that the policies they label represent. 

“Smart power” apparently means that the United States will use “the full range of tools at our disposal” and that “diplomacy will be at the vanguard of foreign policy”.  She wants a policy that “effectively challenges Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and sponsorship of terror and persuades both Iran and Syria to abandon their dangerous behavior and become constructive regional actors”.  She would “try to achieve greater international support for . . . actions that would actually influence” the Iranian government and its various power centres to stop developing a nuclear weapon, but stressed that “no option is off the table”.

Lots of change we can believe in there, then.

1 comment January 13, 2009

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