The Realist

As you’ve probably heard, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces have just launched an offensive into South Waziristan to take on elements of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies.  This operation is by far the most important development in the region since Obama took over the presidency, overshadowing his dispatch of 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan earlier this year in importance.  While the deployment of those troops was merely a holding action to prevent a rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, the Pakistani offensive could – if done properly – contribute towards bringing a real shift in the situation in the region.

However, the improvements, if they come at all, are not likely to come quickly.  To understand what is happening here, a very brief history lesson is required.

During and after the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, Taliban and al-Qaeda poured out of Afghanistan through the effectively non-existent border with Pakistan and set up camp throughout the northwest of the country, melding easily into the Pashtun culture from whence many of them came and finding networks of support in the massive Afghan refugee population in the region.

It’s important to recognize the extent to which the Taliban’s initial takeover of Kabul and Afghanistan was in essence a Pashtun colonial project; the homeland of the Taliban has always been Pakistan, specifically the little-governed northwest.  Pakistan encouraged the Taliban to direct their energies in this direction because they viewed Afghanistan as a proxy battleground with India, and because it kept the militants from causing trouble throughout mainland Pakistan.  The U.S. invasion pushed them back.  The Pakistani public routinely describe the U.S. as the biggest threat to their security in polls, and one reason they do this is because they believe the U.S. drove militants from Afghanistan back to Pakistan, there to sow a campaign of terror.

But the groups that were driven from Afghanistan by the U.S. are not the only Taliban.  What we commonly refer to as “the Taliban” is in fact a bewildering array of different groups who lack any centralized command structure.  The Taliban who vex NATO in Afghanistan are not always the same as the Taliban who have been responsible for a recent string of bombings in Pakistan, although the groups have obvious similarities and co-operate with each other.  In December 2007 some 20 groups formed an umbrella organization called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which has given them some unity, but they still have differing agendas.

The first important point about what is currently happening in Pakistan is that the military offensive is restricted in its goals, and is not aimed at all the Taliban groups who carry out cross-border incursions into Afghanistan.  Rather, Pakistani military spokesman have explicitly stated that the offensive is aimed only at militants belonging to the Mehsud network, which has the stated goal of Talibanizing Pakistan – and a more limited, although very real, role in Afghanistan.  Indeed, the military’s area of operations here does not even border Afghanistan.

If the rest of the militant groups in South Waziristan – those who usually concentrate on the fight against NATO – were to join the battle against the military, then the latter would quickly lose.  Many of the militant groups in Waziristan, even some of those under the TTP banner, actively co-operate with the Pakistani state, and appear to have been convinced to stay neutral during this operation – at least for now.  These include groups who send fighters into Afghanistan.

The drone strike that killed Beitullah has made Hakimullah Mehsud, the new emir of the TTP, more disposed than ever towards harming the U.S., on whom he has vowed revenge.  However, the most destructive acts his group have carried out have been in Pakistan – these include the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the recent spate of high-profile bombings that were intended to deter the present offensive.  The TTP is currently experiencing a period of turmoil in its leadership following the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a U.S. drone strike in August, but nothing is more likely to unite the groups than a Pakistani incursion and occupation.  Their attention will be focused on repelling this offensive for some time, giving NATO some temporary breathing room in Afghanistan.

However, the prospect that Pakistan can deliver a long-term pacification even of the limited area of operations in South Waziristan with which it is now concerned is remote.  Much-touted offensives elsewhere against militants have led to proclamations of victory, only to give way to the harsh reality of under-investment in reconstruction and a resurgence of violence.  This is a slight improvement on the peace deals that Islamabad made a habit of cutting with the Taliban during previous offensives, and indeed may be the best that can be hoped for.  But the simple fact is that Pakistan lacks the political will – as well as the military capability – to deliver a long-term pacification of the tribal regions.

The question of political will boils down to who Pakistanis see as their biggest threat, and hence against whom they array most of their military might.  This is India.  The number of troops deployed to the pacification of the tribal regions is a small fraction of the number deployed on the Indian border.  Hundreds of thousands more would be needed to be moved from the Indian border to the tribal regions for the military to be able to clear the area of the enemy, hold it indefinitely, and build civilian projects to win over the population; this would divert an unrealistic quantity of resources from the rest of Pakistan and is likely to fail anyway because of the deep animus felt by the residents of the area towards Islamabad.  It would be a generational effort, at great cost, for a cause that Pakistanis consider of minor importance to themselves and only of concern to their hated U.S. patron.

The Pakistani military also lack the capability for the sort of low-intensity counter-insurgency war that they would need to fight in the tribal regions to be ultimately successful, because the Pakistani militant is equipped for large-scale, Cold War-era battles against a conventional foe, not guerrilla war.  Their previous operations in the tribal agencies have been punitive raids which were over-reliant on air power and artillery and that left the region strewn with civilian casualties.  The Taliban don’t even need to fight in such battles; they just hide, let civilians die, and reap a propaganda victory, much like Hamas did during Operation Cast Lead.  The military then eventually leaves and the militants re-emerge, stronger than before.

In the West, we have to understand that Pakistan considers the risk posed by the Taliban to be, if not insignificant, certainly not the most pressing strategic priority.  There is a broad consensus on this between the military and the civilian population.  The astute observer will also notice that all of the targets of terrorist outrages in Pakistan prior to this offensive have been military or police ones, not civilian.  The terrorists know that civilian outrages would delegitimize them and lead to a violent swing in public opinion against them, where at the moment there is a deep ambivalence.  The message is simple.  To the security forces: leave us alone and we will leave you alone.  To the people of Pakistan: why meddle?

The end-game of this offensive is very hard to fathom.  But it will not be a resolution of the problems in South Asia for either Islamabad or Washington.  It could certainly lead to the death of a great many dangerous people, but if handled improperly it will create more.  It is hard to believe that the hardcore al-Qaeda infrastructure is remaining in the area to be destroyed, and indeed the offensive could have the effect of dispersing a lot of dangerous terrorists all over the world.  Some will be caught as they flee, others will not; don’t expect Osama bin Laden to be found in a spiderhole.  It could, maybe, lead to the pacification of this small area.  A crucial sanctuary for terror could be destroyed, but the ideology, the means, and the people will move on, and the war will continue; as, it seems, it always does.