Archive for March, 2009

Gerecht on Iran and the inevitability of an Iranian nuke

Middle East expert Ruehl Marc Gerecht has a must-read piece in The Weekly Standard about Obama’s overtures to Iran.  It’s all pretty common sense, matter-of-fact stuff, but a far cry from anything you read in the mainstream press:

Washington is again putting U.S.-Iranian relations on the psychiatrist’s couch, treating the mullahs as if they were something other than masters of Islamic machtpolitik. Obama’s message to Khamenei emphasizes “mutual respect,” “shared hopes,” “common dreams,” and Iran’s great historic “ability to build and create.” I would bet the national debt that the president and the supreme leader share not a single hope or dream that could possibly have any bearing on the relations between their two countries. Khamenei is a serious revolutionary cleric and a man of considerable personal integrity who has suffered severely for his beliefs (in 1981 a bomb blast mangled his right arm). He is a faithful son of the Islamic revolution.

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Khamenei has led revolutionary Iran since the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. To fulfill God’s promise and his own duty, Khamenei authorized the bombing attack on the United States at Khobar Towers (U.S. death toll: 19 servicemen) in 1996; aid to violent Islamist groups including al Qaeda (see the 9/11 Commission report), Hezbollah, and Hamas; the export to Iraq of Iranian-manufactured remote-controlled explosive devices and Iranian-trained assassination teams; ties with anti-American regimes abroad (President Chávez of Venezuela has visited four times); and the development of a nuclear weapons program. Khamenei–not Iran’s colorful president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad–turned the Islamic Republic into a turbo-charged engine of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. Khamenei, not Ahmadinejad, con-verted the Revolutionary Guards Corps and its thuggish, morals-enforcing appendage, the Basij, into major political players.

On Khamenei’s watch, the Iranian reform movement, spearheaded by disaffected disciples of the revolution and university students, has been politically crushed and many of its most important members exiled, jailed, beaten, and, in the case of Saeed Hajjarian, a founding father of the clerical regime’s intelligence service, shot in the head. As Iran’s internal politics have gotten worse, however, Western hope for meaningful diplomacy with the regime has risen.

Thus, the eternal advocates of en–gagement counsel engaging Khamenei, who they insist is really a “conservative pragmatist.” Thoughtful Iran analysts have peered into the eyes of Khamenei (his speeches aren’t helpful) and seen Boeing aircraft parts, oil and gas deals, pipelines, and eventually an American embassy in Tehran. They have not seen a man of God and politics whose cherished conception of a just world is inimical to both Democratic and Republican visions of what is right.

This hope attached to Khamenei and to dialogue is partly just a reaction against George W. Bush. Many feared Bush would attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. “Diplomacy first, diplomacy only” became a mantra in Europe, since most Europeans would rather see the clerics go nuclear than have the United States (or Israel) do anything harsh to stop them. Most in the Obama administration no doubt share this view.

But misleading analysis easily follows: Europeans and Americans who are adamantly opposed to the use of force (or economy-crushing sanctions) naturally start to see “pragmatists” where they don’t exist. Khamenei calls the United States “Satan Incarnate” and President Obama responds with a verse about brotherhood from the Persian Sufi poet Saadi. To respond otherwise would be to act like Bush. (Note to the White House: Revolutionary clerics don’t appreciate Sufism, with its ecumenical call for brotherhood. They harass and suppress it.)

Read the whole thing.

What is particularly unappealing about the debate over Iran in the west is the fact it takes place without reference to the evidence of the regime’s behaviour.  “In diplomacy and espionage, there is no worse mistake than ‘mirror-imaging,’”, writes Gerecht, ”that is, ascribing to foreigners your own actions and views. For Westerners this is especially debilitating, given our modern proclivity to assume that others pursue their interests in secular, material, and guilt-ridden ways.”

For all the talk of Iranian “reformers” and how they might abandon the nuclear programme if only we “respect” them, there is virtually no evidence that this would be the case.  The two past Iranian presidents who after earned the plaudit “reformer” – Khomeini and Rafsanjani – really proved to be anything but when it came to external relations, with regime-sponsored terror attacks happening on their watch.  The nuclear programme also began under the rule of Khatami.  The debate over “reformers” in the clerical establishment ignores the fact that it is this establishment itself which is the problem, and that export of Islamic revolution and terrorism are built into the Iranian Constitution and its power structures.  This isn’t a system that is desperately seeking the approval of the United States, it is a system that is desperately seeking to hurt the interests of the United States as they are commonly defined by a consensus among the U.S. political elite, Republican and Democrat.

So, we need to be aware, that all of this talk among ourselves, all of this accomodation, all of this procrastination, is really just a smokescreen for the inevitable: our acquiesence in the emergence of an Iranian nuke.  To say we are “trying” diplomacy is to say we are trying a strategy that any rational, disinterested person can assess – with reference to history and contemporary knowledge – is almost certain to fail.  Let us at least be honest about what we are doing, even if our leaders cannot be.

Add comment March 31, 2009

Shift in Pakistani insurgency perhaps ultimately auspicious

The attack on the Lahore police academy in Pakistan yesterday is just the latest demonstration of a shift in the strategy of the Pakistani insurgency, which is moving its focus to the heartland of the Pakistani state.  Along with the worrying developments in the Swat valley, one gets the impression that the urgent threat posed by the insurgents is gradually dawning on the Pakistani elite.  This, in turn, will hopefully lead to a more resolute Pakistani strategy to counter the problem, which will have positive knock-on effects in the fight against international terrorism.

As by now is well known after being repeated ad nauseum in the media, the Pakistani military and intelligence services have been ambivalent towards the country’s extremists because they see them as useful tools against India and to manipulate the situation in Afghanistan.  This argument is much less plausible when the extremists are taking the battle to the heart of Pakistan.  The new willingness of the extremists to do just that is based on several factors.  Among these are their current position of great strength, attained after years of being allowed to operate with impunity; the recent alliances the groups have forged, which have extended their collective reach; and their sense that the Pakistani state is teetering on the brink and could collapse.

In other words, it seems likely – or at least possible – that the Pakistani security establishment might soon realize that it has created a horrible hydra which it can no longer control and which no longer serves its interests.  While in the west we are frequently focused on the issue of whether Pakistan has a military or civilian government, in terms of our interests the exact shape of the Pakistani government is not terribly important so long as it is viable and it pursues the extremists.  Ultimately, the Pakistani security establishment – the military and ISI – has no interest in seeing the country descend into anarchy, becoming an Islamist dystopia, or letting its nuclear weapons fall into the hands of extremists.  Nor does the civilian establishment.  They need to come to terms with one another and avoid their internecine feuding to confront the extremist threat; a civilian government would be favourable because it is more representative, but a military government in tune with our interests is not the end of the world either.

All of this is going to require that Pakistanis urgently get over their inordinate fear of India.  Many Pakistanis view the extremists as mere tools of India, trying to weaken the state to the advantage of their neighbour.  And while there is little doubt that India’s queerly-named Research and Analysis Wing, its external intelligence agency, is completely absent from the equation, it should be clear that the problem is mainly a homegrown Pakistani one.

The United States needs to urgently seek to defuse tensions between these two countries and to create some sort of community of interest between them, one which should not be impossible to find given that they both suffer terror attacks from the same groups.  Reducing the perception of possible war between the two countries is the only surefire way to make real and sustainable progress in this situation, and hence also to address NATO’s problem in Afghanistan.  Anything that focuses the Pakistani establishment’s minds on the real problem of domestic extremism is a bonus, because for the sake of global stability we need someone to run effective counterinsurgency on Pakistani soil.  I hope that the Pakistani state will realize the stakes and begin to act appropriately before it collapses, and each new attack drives home the urgency of this need.

I’ll finish by quoting, in its entirety, an editorial from Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper:

It should be clear by now that we are at war with ourselves as the enemy within grows more audacious by the day. Yet there are educated people in this country who continue to blame American foreign policy and the ever-potent ‘foreign hand’ for the wave of terrorism sweeping the country. This argument is deeply flawed on several counts.

For one thing, the Pakistani state threw its weight behind America’s Afghan policy in the late ’70s and after 9/11, and as such we are equally responsible for the fallout. It is also common knowledge that Pakistani intelligence agencies once provided logistical support to militant organisations that could further our ‘strategic depth’ interests in Kashmir and across the Durand Line.

It is argued that those behind the storming of the police training centre in Lahore on Monday, and the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team earlier this month, were so sophisticated in their methods that they must necessarily have had the backing of a foreign power. Such reasoning overlooks the fact that those who were freedom fighters a few years ago and are now labelled as terrorists were trained by the best in the business.

Let us assume for a moment, even if the truth lies elsewhere, that the terrorists who attacked Lahore on Monday were in the pay of an antagonistic neighbour. Does that absolve the Punjab government and the Pakistani state of the charge of gross negligence? Does it in any way disprove those who maintain that such incidents point to monumental intelligence failures and security lapses? It doesn’t matter who the paymasters might be.

What we have now are Pakistanis killing Pakistanis, Muslims killing Muslims. And while we are at it, let us discard once and for all the absurd notion that the people who carry out such dastardly acts cannot possibly be Muslims. They are Muslims. In fact, these terrorists and militants consider themselves to be far truer Muslims than those who oppose them.

The militants involved in Monday’s siege may have been overcome but it is time to hammer out a political and social consensus on this issue. It is time to show the kind of fervour the obscurantists demonstrate in abundance but the well-meaning couch in carefully chosen words. This is a fight and it cannot be won without throwing punches.

The country’s mainstream political parties need to draw a line in the sand and show the people, with no room for ambiguity, where they stand in this battle for the soul of Pakistan. The religio-political parties must also make their positions clear. President Obama says that US ground forces will not enter Pakistan. We would be well advised to not give them the chance. If we can’t do the job ourselves, others might do it for us. And that way lies disaster.

Amen.

Add comment March 31, 2009

Hezbollah uses Mexico drug routes

In one of those key national security stories you only get if you read The Washington Times, U.S. officials are saying that Hezbollah exploits Mexican drug trafficking routes for cash and to get operatives into the U.S.:

Hezbollah is using the same southern narcotics routes that Mexican drug kingpins do to smuggle drugs and people into the United States, reaping money to finance its operations and threatening U.S. national security, current and former U.S. law enforcement, defense and counterterrorism officials say.

The Iran-backed Lebanese group has long been involved in narcotics and human trafficking in South America’s tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. Increasingly, however, it is relying on Mexican narcotics syndicates that control access to transit routes into the U.S.

Hezbollah relies on “the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels,” said Michael Braun, who just retired as assistant administrator and chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

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In 2006, [Hezbollah] fought a 34-day war against Israel, which remains its primary adversary. To finance its operations, it relies in part on funding from a large Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim diaspora that stretches from the Middle East to Africa and Latin America. Some of the funding comes from criminal enterprises.

Although there have been no confirmed cases of Hezbollah moving terrorists across the Mexico border to carry out attacks in the United States, Hezbollah members and supporters have entered the country this way.

Last year, Salim Boughader Mucharrafille was sentenced to 60 years in prison by Mexican authorities on charges of organized crime and immigrant smuggling. Mucharrafille, a Mexican of Lebanese descent, owned a cafe in the city of Tijuana, across the border from San Diego. He was arrested in 2002 for smuggling 200 people, said to include Hezbollah supporters, into the U.S.

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Two U.S. law enforcement officers, familiar with counterterrorism operations in the U.S. and Latin America, said that “it was no surprise” that Hezbollah members have entered the U.S. border through drug cartel transit routes.

“The Mexican cartels have no loyalty to anyone,” one of the officials told The Washington Times. “They will willingly or unknowingly aid other nefarious groups into the U.S. through the routes they control. It has already happened. That’s why the border is such a serious national security issue.”

A senior U.S. defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of ongoing operations in Latin America, warned that al Qaeda also could use trafficking routes to infiltrate operatives into the U.S.

The whole thing is worth a read.

Add comment March 30, 2009

Egypt to skip Arab summit due to anger at Iran, Qatar

Although western media is much more focused on the fact that Sudanese president Bashir al-Assad is attending the Arab summit in Qatar despite the ICC warrant for his arrest, the more interesting story is the fact that Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is refusing to attend.  He is angry about Qatar’s stance during Operation Cast Lead – Qatar backs Hamas – and also because Qatar has seen fit to invite Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Persian Iran to the summit.  All of these facts speak volumes about the realities on the ground in the Middle East, realities that western commentators are often keen to minimize.

The whole thing highlights how heavily Iran is now involved in the affairs of the Arab world, particularly in its support of Hamas and Hezbollah.  Qatar has invited Ahmadinejad because it says Iran plays a crucial role in Arab affairs through its support of these non-state groups, which is what so infuriates Mubarak.  While we argue about the extent of influence and control that Tehran has over these groups, among the Arabs themselves it is taken as a basic fact.  Mubarak sees Syria and Qatar as trojan horses for Iran’s influence in the Arab world and thinks that these countries should back Egypt, which Iran is challenging for regional hegemony.  Most other Arab countries do indeed back Egypt, but Syria and Qatar have found that bucking the trend is a key to notoriety.

The battle between Islamist Iran and its proxies on the one hand the secular Arab dictatorships on the other is the most important factor in the Middle East now - it is especially crucial to the future of Israel.  Iran tries to appeal over the heads of the Arab rulers to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the increasingly-radical Shia population in Bahrain, and much of its support for Hamas and Hezbollah is an attempt to boost the standing of violent extremism.  Indeed, supporting such movements is a goal enshrined in the Iranian Constitution and to which the regime’s Qods Force is exclusively dedicated.  The more Arab countries that bandwagon with the Iranian menace, the harder it becomes to oppose it.

Here’s some background on the Egyptian-Iranian relationship:

They were differences by proxy, however, over Syria’s support of Iran and its differences with Saudi Arabia. What annoyed the aging Egyptian leader, who is 81 next May, was Syria and Qatar’s stance on the Gaza war of December 2008-January 2009.

Mubarak was furious with the seizure of Gaza by Hamas in 2007. When Israel decided to attack the Islamic group late last year he saw it as a blessing in disguise, feelings which were in stark contrast to the rising anger on the Egyptian street. Mubarak felt that if Hamas won the war he would no longer share borders with Palestine, but with Iran, due to Hamas’ relationship with Tehran. He felt that if Hamas survived, Iran would get the upper hand and threaten Egypt in its advance of what he calls “a Shi’ite threat” to Sunni countries in the Arab world.

Egypt and Iran have not been on good terms since the latter’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Before that, Cairo was close to Tehran, with the royal families of both countries inter-married and both the shah and the Egyptian monarchy staunch allies of the West. Cairo was furious at the toppling of the shah in 1979, and over Iran’s praise for the Islamic fundamentalists who murdered former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981.

Iran continues to name a street in honor of Sadat’s assassin, Khalid Islambouli, while Egypt continues to enrage Iran by referring to the Persian Gulf as the “Arab Gulf”. In the 1950s, Egypt’s late president Gamal Abdul Nasser would infuriate Iranians by threatening to conquer Iran’s Khuzestan province – which he called Arabstan. While these differences are seemingly mild, or “historical”, they remain deep-rooted in Egyptian officialdom, as Iran has refused to apologize or establish normal diplomatic relations with Cairo.

More recently, the real fear in Egypt is of Iran’s ambitions in the Arab world. Last month, a senior Iranian official made remarks that threatened the sovereignty of Bahrain – sending shockwaves through Cairo, which then lobbied its African ally, Morocco, to cut off diplomatic relations with Tehran. Egypt regards itself as a heavyweight in the Arab world and said that it if did have an embassy in Tehran it would have closed it.

Egypt is scared by Hamas as it is a product of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the region’s most influential opposition movement. A victory for Hamas could certainly enflame emotions of the Egyptian Brotherhood and could spark a revolt from within. In 2005, when Egypt’s ambassador to Iraq was kidnapped and then murdered, semi-official Egyptian dailies pointed the finger at Iran. The media argued that the Islamic republic did not want Arabs to have any presence in Baghdad as they wished to keep it as Iran’s own sphere of influence.

Due to all of these problems, Egypt is afraid of Tehran, and remains upset with countries like Syria and Qatar which are allied to it. Egypt feels that these nations are dividing the Arab world and should be firmly supporting Egypt. Qatar argues that due to Iran’s influence over non-state players like Hamas and Hezbollah, which are the root of the Arab world’s current differences, it is only logical that Iran would be present at the Arab summit, even though it is a non-Arab country.

Add comment March 30, 2009

Baghdad must pay Awakening salaries – yesterday

Iraq’s Maliki government is facing a crucial test of intent this week.  Over the weekend, the Iraqi military – backed by U.S. forces – arrested the leader of the Fadhil Awakening Council and engaged in gun battles with his followers.  The Awakening Councils are organized militias, many of whom are former insurgents, who came into the legal fold over the previous few years after fractures within the insurgency convinced them that backing the government was the best way to safeguard the future of the Sunni community.

The problem is that because the groups are often composed of former insurgents, and because they are an armed force outside of the government command structure, the Shia around Maliki are suspicious of their intent.  Under a deal reached with the Americans after control of the groups was passed from the U.S. to Baghdad, the government is supposed to pay all of the members of the groups their salaries of $300 a month until they can be found civilian jobs.  Only very small numbers have been found civilian jobs so far, and the steep decline in oil revenues that the government has been experiencing has made them unwilling to focus their scant resources on a Sunni militia.  Many have not had their salaries paid in two or three months.  Yet, the quiescence of the groups is vital to Iraq’s future.

It is unlikely that U.S. forces would have participated in this operation if there were not a great deal of evidence that the people arrested were involved in criminal activity – the leader of the Council stands accused of leading a Baathist military organization, which is a violation of the Iraqi constitution, as well as murder, extortion, and attacking coalition forces.  But in a country where rumours and innuendo rule, the operation could easily be seen as a joint U.S.-Iraqi betrayal of the Awakening movement, which spilled so much of its own blood in the battle against al-Qaeda.  I do not think there is much credence to the idea that the Awakening members could go back to al-Qaeda, but they could easily reconstitute other insurgent groups like the Islamic Army and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and cause real problems for both the U.S. and the Maliki government.

What Maliki does next is crucial.  If he is serious about sectarian reconciliation, he needs to expedite salary payments to the rest of the Awakening Councils and speed them into civilian jobs.  This is ultimately just as in the interest of the Shia as it is of the Sunnis, because neither group is going to gain from a renewed sectarian conflict.  Paying the rest of the members and then trying the leader of the Fadhil Council in an open court is the only way to make it clear that this weekend’s operation was not the start of a general crackdown on the Awakening movement, but a move against one group of people who were bringing the whole movement into disrepute.  Maliki’s status us a serious player – and Iraq’s future - depends on it, as I hope Barack Obama has made personally clear to him.

Add comment March 30, 2009

Syria a key to Middle East’s future

If you want a good insight into the forces that are going to shape the future of the Middle East, check out this Associated Press piece on Syria’s diplomacy. Say what you like about Bashir al-Assad, but he has played the game brilliantly: after positioning himself as Iran’s trojan horse among the Arab states for the last several years, he is now flirting with a return to the Arab fold – along with a possible peace treaty with Israel and a rapprochement with the United States – all to be accomplished, of course, at a substantial price tag.

Syrian President Bashar Assad has been enjoying the new attention. But Damascus has its own agenda, hoping in particular for an economic boost and a peace deal with Israel. It is also reluctant to give up its ties to Iran and Arab militants, because those alliances give it the power to influence events in the region — from Lebanon and the Israeli-Arab conflict, to Iraq.

A gauge of Arab countries’ headway with Syria will come on Monday, when Arab leaders gather for their annual summit in the capital of the Gulf state of Qatar. “Arab reconciliation” will top the agenda at the Doha gathering, Arab League Deputy Secretary-General Ahmed Ben Heli said this week. The venue is notable because Qatar has also been at odds with Egypt and Saudi Arabia for its close ties with Syria, Iran and Hamas.

The Saudis and the Egyptians are deeply worried that Shiite-dominated Iran is seeking to fuel Islamic radicalism and establish itself as regional superpower. They blame Syria for helping Iran.

Syria is an important state in the Middle East, although it is not as important as Iran. Indeed, much of its recent prominence comes from riding the coat-tails of Iran.  A crucial goal of the Arab states is to decouple Syria from Iran so that Iran can be more easily isolated and opposed; getting Syria to abandon Tehran is particularly important in this regard because it will allow the conflict between Iran and the Arab states to be cast as a matter of Persian vs. Arab, something which is difficult to do when Syria is putting an Arab face on Iran’s policies.

But Syria is not going to move away from Iran if it perceives Tehran to be on the right side of history: Assad has positioned himself perfectly to pick to be on the side of the winner.  But his decision will in itself have an impact on the outcome of the contest for influence in the Middle East, especially in the crucial realm of perception and momentum.  When faced with a rising power, countries have two basic options: bandwagon or resist.  Bandwagoning creates momentum for further bandwagoning by other states, whereas resisting stiffens everyone’s resolve.  Unfortunately, if Iran is going to be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon, then bandwagoning makes much more sense for Damascus than resisting.

But at the moment, Assad seems to be making the right noises.  He has said he is interested in a peace deal with Israel; the United States is reported to be considering a meeting between Obama and Assad; and Assad is at least talking to the other Arab countries, although these talks are fractious and apparently sometimes nasty, as might be expected between brothers.  What remains to be seen is how serious he is, and what he might demand in return for what he can give – he cannot sign a peace treaty with Israel with one hand and continue to provide aid and comfort to Hamas with the other.  Nor can he prevent the mullahs’ nuclear programme, which is the real prize here: and one we might do well not to lose sight of.

1 comment March 28, 2009

Eleven thoughts on the Afghanistan/Pakistan plan

One can’t help but be underwhelmed by Obama’s new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan because the goal – and given the lack of resources available, this can really be the only goal – is slow and incremental progress. Yesterday he announced that he will be sending 4,000 more military trainers to Afghanistan along with unspecified numbers of civilians to work on development. This personnel increase comes on top of the 17,000 new combat troops who he announced earlier in the year.

Here are some thoughts on the new strategy:

1) We are being told that Obama’s strategy is laudable because it sets limited and achievable goals in Afghanistan, but weren’t we being told in the last news cycle that President Bush’s problem in Afghanistan was that he only sought… limited goals? According to the conventional wisdom, Bush did not put the resources necessary to win into Afghanistan because he focused on Iraq. This was especially noticable because there was a mismatch between presidential rhetoric about turning Afghanistan into a stable democracy, and the actual means invested in doing so. Which leads me to:

2) Obama’s strategy basically boils down to pursuing the goals that Bush pursued – defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban – with a greater c0mmitment of resources. It’s not clear to me how this is a vast improvement – sure, he’s eliminated the rhetorical mismatch that existed under Bush, but he’s done so by scaling simply by back his rhetoric, not actually redefining his goals. This is important to remember, because the media are telling you otherwise: Obama’s goals in Afghanistan as announced yesterday are exactly the ones that Bush sought (although not the ones he said he was seeking), and was denounced for seeking, over the previous few years.

3) And the problem with these goals is that they are insufficient. In fact, it’s almost like the Obama administration is reverting back to the failed Bush strategy in Iraq during 2003 – 06. Defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban requires widespread change in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that terrorists cannot find safe harbour there after U.S. forces eventually withdraw. This means the creation of a government in Kabul that is capable of enforcing security throughout its territory, and not hospitable to terrorists – economic development and political progress towards democracy are the only sure buttresses of such a government.

4) The biggest hole in the Obama plan, so far as I can see, is the question of end-states. When talking about Iraq, General David Petraeus used to always say “Tell me how this ends” – what is the situation going to look like at the end. I am left completely clueless as to how the Obama administration envisages Afghanistan ten or twenty years from now – we’ve established that it won’t be a “Central Asian Valhalla” (a strage turn of phrase, as Valhalla is where dead warriors go), but that’s a straw man because nobody ever said it was going to be. Claiming that they’re just going after the bad guys is misleading because clearly they have some sort of political-economic plan – they have to – and I want to know what it is. Are they avoiding saying it because they’re not sure of what they can achieve?

5) Indeed, Obama’s plan seems particularly bizzare because we’re hearing endless lectures about how there aren’t military solutions to insurgencies, and then being offerred what is basically a military solution to an insurgency. At this stage, I am willing to give the administration the benefit of the doubt and hope that all this rhetoric about limited goals is a misguided attempt to satisfy domestic anti-war constituencies, and that they do realize Afghanistan needs a long-term comprehensive investment using all elements of national power.

6) But all this talk of limited goals gives enormous comfort to the enemy, and enormous fears to the Pakistanis who are used to hearing American promises and then being abandoned. Obama’s whole tone is wrong, and while he could just about get away with it when announcing a strategic withdrawal in Iraq, it seems like madness when announcing a strategic offensive. “We’re going to try, but not as hard as before, and it’s really difficult, and I might have to change my strategy, and by the way we’re really tight on resources over here,” Obama just signalled to the Taliban. What he should say is: “We’re thin on resources, but I don’t care, and I’ll give every dollar I need to and call upon our men to make every ultimate sacrifice necessary, because this is the most important global security challenge of our time, and we will overcome it.”

7) This was a strategy based on compromise, as was fairly obvious from reading it and has been described in detail in the NYT today. The generals wanted more troops, and they wanted them now: they didn’t get them. Joe Biden was worried about selling the plan to Congress, and the last man in the room on every decision Obama makes was the most cautious one: do you think George Bush ever planned a war strategy based on what would play over well in Congress? Did any president ever plan a successful war strategy that way?

8 ) The trainers are supposed to help the Afghan army reach 134,000 members by 2011, and the police force 82,000. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is one of the most respected and effective institutions in the country, and it arguably needs to be much larger than 134,000 – as argued recently by Max Boot and Fred Kagan, who say they need to be double that size. Iraq, which has a smaller population who are more more heavily-concentrated in urban areas, has a total of 500,000 members in its security forces. The size of the ANA and the NATO presence in Afghanistan is not going to allow the pursuit of a strategy of clear/hold/rebuild such as was followed in Iraq, because there simply isn’t enough manpower to control all the territory. And who is going to control it after NATO leave?

9) Obama’s wishy-washy compromise attitude isn’t going to encourage NATO to take part, even though Obama said in his speech – correctly – that this is NATO’s greatest challenge yet. In fact, if Afghanistan is the test case of the idea of collective security and burden-sharing via NATO, we can say pretty categorically that NATO has failed that test. Only decisive American leadership would have convinced them otherwise – even then it would be difficult, but going on about how limited your goals are isn’t the way to do it, especially given how intractable the situation is.

10) And the situation is so intractable because of the Pakistan factor, which is going to prove key in all this: even if you had the best government ever in Kabul, completely enforcing security throughout all of Afghanistan, we would still have a massive problem because of the Pakistani tribal areas. We need the Pakistani army to fight a concerted counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas, and our only means of making them do it are pressuring them with aid (which they know that ultimately we can’t withdraw because we need the government to be stable) and by trying to lessen tensions between themselves and India (which I am increasingly convinced is the crux of this whole matter) so they will focus their resources where they are needed.

11) So it all boils down to this: the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is majorly FUBAR. Success is going to be gradual, incremental, and hard to quantify. There will be seemingly insurmountable setbacks, and there will even be new terrorist attacks outside of the region, including in Britain and the United States, which will cause us to redouble our efforts. Obama has done well to embrace the war and make it his own, and he has bravely committed new troops to the fight. The NATO cause in Afghanistan would be well-served if he would do so with more conviction and by explaining exactly what is goals are; the American people and the allies he is calling on to assist him deserve to know, too.

Add comment March 28, 2009

China’s evolving military

Every year, the Pentagon has to deliver – by law – a report to Congress on China’s military power and intentions.  The latest one has just come out.  I’ve read it for you and here are some of the interesting points.

The most important thing to understand about China’s military is that for all we hear about their massive military build-up and possible future strategic threat, they are not in the same league as the U.S.  They’re not even in the same sport.  While the U.S. military has a global reach and specializes in projecting power and supporting massive expeditionary forces halfway around the world (while facing virtually zero conventional threat to the homeland), China’s ability to project power beyond its immediate region is meagre.  The PLA has a sealift capacity of a mere 5,000 troops and an airdrop capacity of about the same and lacks the ability to resupply even small numbers of troops far beyond its borders.  They are playing quite a different game to the U.S.  The report says:

The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. China will not be able to project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able to project and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade.

The dominant strategic doctrine in China at the moment is that while the country is undergoing a period of rapid domestic change, it needs to avoid antagonizing the rest of the world or getting involved in the international system too much.  Basically Beijing wants to be left alone so that it can focus on its internal matters, but it also knows that it has to maintain a sufficient military capability to deter aggression and to make sure Taiwan does not declare de jure independence.  China does not anticipate a full-scale U.S. attack, but it can foresee a limited U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan, or aggression by a local power.  Its strategy for dealing with this is to focus on what it calls “local wars under conditions of informatization”.

This basically means they are currently focusing on fighting high-tech, mobile wars in their near abroad, particularly against Taiwan.  “Informatization” is a fancy way of saying that they are seeking the sort of high-tech integration of command, control, intelligence, and communications which makes the U.S. military so effective, and it means a movement away from the sort of comparatively low-tech attrition strategy that they used to follow.  They especially want the capacity to inflict enough damage on the U.S. to deter Washington from ever launching any sort of attack on China.  Their main means for doing this are:

  • Strategic nuclear forces, which they have upgraded and made more mobile recently to the point that the Pentagon says they could inflict “significant damage on most large American cities” – effectively creating a situation where a large-scale war between the two countries is inconceivable;
  • For lesser contingencies, they have focused on anti-ship capabilities which could inflict massive damage on any naval task force which the U.S. sent to defend Taiwan – including the ability to take down aircraft carriers and fourth-generation aircraft which are a match for the best U.S. jet fighters;
  • The ability to hit U.S. bases, airfields and logistics hubs throughout the Pacific with conventional (and nuclear) missiles.
  • Anti-satellite weapons which would allow the Chinese to destroy U.S. communications and surveillance assets which are critical in modern warfare, as the Chinese observed from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

So, in other words, China knows it probably cannot defeat the U.S. in a major conventional regional war, but it wants to be able to inflict so much pain that it probably wouldn’t be worth the U.S. bothering; such a war is anyway highly unlikely, which means that all of these assets could be used to quickly dominate and annihilate lesser powers who would know there was little chance of U.S. intervention to defend them.  The Chinese also want to maintain the capability to control vital sealanes through which resources vital to their economy pass; for instance, 80% of Chinese oil goes through the Straits of Malaga.  They also want the ability to intervene quickly in North Korea in the case of a North Korean collapse.

So, to summarize, this was another year in which the Chinese military spent a lot of money becoming more mobile, more integrated, and more high-tech, all of which mean it is gradually becoming more capable at launching effective military operations in its near abroad.  However, the quantity of work still to be done is enormous, and the military still has very little operational experience, all of which means that Beijing’s ability to conduct major military operations has not been significantly augmented over the past year, even as their deterrent capability has seen significant recent improvement.

Add comment March 26, 2009

Obama administration leaks details of Pakistani support for Taliban

In a massive front-page leak to The New York Times, Obama administration officials have provided more details than ever before about the extent to which Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency aids and abets militant groups in the tribal areas.  This is part of a co-ordinated strategy to pressure the Pakistani government into ending its double game, and is the sort of thing that Bush never proved willing to do with Musharraf.

Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders publicly deny any government ties to militant groups, and American officials say it is unlikely that top officials in Islamabad are directly coordinating the clandestine efforts. American officials have also said that midlevel ISI operatives occasionally cultivate relationships that are not approved by their bosses.

In a sign of just how resigned Western officials are to the ties, the British government has sent several dispatches to Islamabad in recent months asking that the ISI use its strategy meetings with the Taliban to persuade its commanders to scale back violence in Afghanistan before the August presidential election there, according to one official.

But the inability, or unwillingness, of the embattled civilian government, led by President Asif Ali Zardari, to break the ties that bind the ISI to the militants illustrates the complexities of a region of shifting alliances. Obama administration officials admit that they are struggling to understand these allegiances as they try to forge a strategy to quell violence in Afghanistan, which has intensified because of a resurgent Taliban. Fighting this insurgency is difficult enough, officials said, without having to worry about an allied spy service’s supporting the enemy.

Last year, Zardari tried to bring the ISI under civilian control and away from the military – which might have allowed him to effectively cleanse it – but the move was effectively blocked by the military establishment.  There is even less chance of him being successful in controlling the service in the future because his government is getting weaker and weaker; indeed, it appears that the Obama administration is going to have to stand by their man rather than risk plunging the country into chaos by undercutting the civilian leader.  Think of the analogy of the shah of Iran and Carter: behind closed doors, Carter was telling the shah to use force to quell the revolution, but because he had spent so long publicly talking about human rights and undercutting the Iranian monarch in other ways he backed himself into a corner and had to let the shah be overthrown.  Whether the Islamist regime is really an improvement on the shah is left as an exercise to the reader, but it spells out one lesson clearly: when you have two bad options to choose from, seeking refuge in wishful thinking is a dangerous fallacy.

But the Pakistanis offered a more nuanced portrait. They said the contacts were less threatening than the American officials depicted and were part of a strategy to maintain influence in Afghanistan for the day when American forces would withdraw and leave what they fear could be a power vacuum to be filled by India, Pakistan’s archenemy. A senior Pakistani military officer said, “In intelligence, you have to be in contact with your enemy or you are running blind.”

This is a fair comment – and the Pakistanis are much more capable of making distinctions between the insurgent groups than we are.  The fact is that there isn’t any sort of “solution” in the tribal areas, just a never-ending Great Game: and alliances with some groups are going to be necessary.  Okay.  But the question is, which ones?

Little is publicly known about the ISI’s S Wing, which officials say directs intelligence operations outside of Pakistan. American officials said that the S Wing provided direct support to three major groups carrying out attacks in Afghanistan: the Taliban based in Quetta, Pakistan, commanded by Mullah Muhammad Omar; the militant network run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and a different group run by the guerrilla leader Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Dennis C. Blair, the director of national intelligence, recently told senators that the Pakistanis “draw distinctions” among different militant groups.

“There are some they believe have to be hit and that we should cooperate on hitting, and there are others they think don’t constitute as much of a threat to them and that they think are best left alone,” Mr. Blair said.

The Haqqani network, which focuses its attacks on Afghanistan, is considered a strategic asset to Pakistan, according to American and Pakistani officials, in contrast to the militant network run by Baitullah Mehsud, which has the goal of overthrowing Pakistan’s government.

The point emerges: for some segments of the Pakistani military establishment, sending Islamists into Afghanistan isn’t such a bad idea.  They want to use proxies to assert control over Afghanistan so they can use it in a war against India (Pakistani military doctrine envisages a defence-in-depth which would include the use of Afghan territory) and they want to focus the efforts of the militant groups on coalition forces.  After all, these are Pakistani militants who, rather than trying to bomb Islamabad, are heading northwest to bomb someone else; if you were the Pakistanis, would you want to provoke them into going south instead?

But the point that everyone involved needs to grasp is that there needs to be a comprehensive plan for the whole region, not one where each part is working against the goals of the other – and for the Obama administration to gain the crucial leverage in implementing this plan, they need to convince the Pakistanis that they are there to stay.  If regional actors think the international community is not committed to Afghanistan and will be leaving soon, they will continue to act in counterproductive ways: if we’re going to address this situation properly, we need a decades-long commitment, and we need everyone to know it’s a decades-long commitment.  Otherwise we’re just another northern power passing through on the road to our own dissolution – and Afghanistan has seen plenty of those.

Add comment March 26, 2009

If I were the Supreme Leader, I would push for the “reformer”

A piece in the NYT about Israel’s public relations problem includes this quote:

“Imagine that Hossein Mousavi wins the Iranian presidency this spring and he names Mohammad Khatami as his foreign minister,” said Meir Javedanfar, an Iran analyst in Israel, referring to two Iranian leaders widely viewed as in the pragmatist camp. “With Lieberman as foreign minister here, Israel will have a much harder time demonstrating to the world that Iran is the destabilizing factor in the region.”

Imagine indeed.  Considering that we know that Iran’s religious apparatus has a vast influence over the outcome of the election – from the pre-approval of candidates to the vast resources it can mobilize for its favoured candidate, as it did for Ahmadinejad, who barely even bothered to campaign – we can well imagine that the Supreme Leader may follow the logic presented by this analyst.  Because the Iranian president has little power and the so-called “reformists” never do anything but tinker around the margins – the nuclear programme, after all, began on Khatami’s watch – having one of them as president wouldn’t in any way harm Iranian strategy.

But it could well bolster it by making the regime appear more palatable to a gullible world.  If a “reformist” is elected, then we can be certain that a pre-emptive military strike against Iran’s nuclear programme will become less likely because of the chorus of voices telling us to “give the new reformer a chance”.  And it will make it much more difficult for western governments to oppose Iran’s amibitions against Israel because it will make it much easier to blame Israel for the atrocities inflicted upon it; meanwhile, we will be told that the “reformist” in Tehran is trying to rein in Hamas and Hezbollah, but only if we give him a chance! — by which will be meant, not attack them and “radicalize them further” (as if this were possible).

We know that a major component of Iranian grand strategy is the attempt to decouple the West from Israel and become hegemonic in the Middle East; and presenting a a “reformist” face to the world - especially with Likud in power in Jerusalem - would be one way of doing exactly this.  Iran is not North Korea, and it does not want to be isolated and hated – rather, it wants to present the world with a fait accompli which may bring diplomatic pain along the way but will ultimately lead to its acceptance as a nuclear power and key global state, ala Pakistan.  Having an ineffectual “reformer” as president – especially one who, last time he was in office, was one of the most strident hard-liners around - could be a key part of this strategy, acting as another smokescreen and making any military action against Iran or its proxies less likely.  In fact, if I were the Supreme Leader, this is exactly the scenario I would aspire to have play out.

Add comment March 19, 2009

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